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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 20943

RICHARD PIERCE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues to be determined are as follows:
1)

Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial

to support the jury's verdict.
2)

Whether the Court properly exercised its discretion

in declining to give an accomplice instruction.
3)

Whether the State's account of the events attendant

to the alleged crime, including testimony that marijuana was
traded in exchange for the stolen property, was relevant to prove
material facts and therefore properly admitted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was convicted by a jury on November 27,
1984 of the offense of Theft by Receiving, a Third Degree Felony.
The Information charged that he, on or about May 23, 1984,
retained, received or disposed of the property of another worth
more than $250, knowing or believing the property had been
stolen.

There was no dispute regarding defendant's possession of

the property on or about May 23, 1985.

(R. 190-91)

recovered from his possession on his property.

It was

(R. 194-95)

As a

defense it was asserted that the defendant had no knowledge of
the stolen character of the property, and that in any event, the
value of the property did not exceed $250.00.
Mike Adams testified that he had personally been
involved in stealing the property (an air compressor).
17)

(R. 116-

He further testified that he traded it to the defendant for

marijuana worth $100, (R. 121) and that he told defendant that
the air compressor was stolen.

(R. 118-19)

Other witnesses,

including defendant, also testified.
Though there was contradictory evidence both about the
defendant's belief and knowledge and the compressor's value, the
jury found that the defendant did have the requisite state of
mind, and that the property's value supported a felony
conviction.

(R. 58)

The defendant filed an appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The evidence presented at trial included clear and
direct testimony of Mike Adams that he delivered the stolen
property to defendant and told him it was stolen.

Defendant

testified, acknowledging that he had possession of the stolen
compressor both at or around May 23, 1984, and later at the time
it was recovered.

Evidence showed that though the value of the

compressor was in excess of $300, it was traded to defendant in
exchange for marijuana worth only $100.

This and other evidence

clearly is sufficient to support the jury's verdict under the
standard set by this Court.

-2-

Mr. Adams was not an accomplicef and his testimony was
not uncorroborated.

Even if he had been an accomplice, the

giving of an accomplice instruction in this case was not required
since it was within the judge's discretion, and since Mr. Adam's
testimony was not self contradictory, uncertain or improbable,
but, rather, clear, definite and consistent.
The State's evidence of facts attendant to defendant's
receipt of the stolen property, including the evidence of
transfer of marijuana worth $100 in exchange for the stolen
compressor, was intrinsic to the case and essential to the jury's
understanding of it.

That evidence is probative to show, inter

alia, that the value given in exchange for the stolen property
was inordinately small—thereby supporting the inference that
defendant knew or believed the property had been stolen.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's
verdict.

The Court has stated its standard of review of evidence

supporting a conviction as follows:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
and will only interfere when the evidence is
so lacking and insubstantial that a
reasonable man could not possibly have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
We also view in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict those facts which can be
reasonably inferred from the evidence
presented to it.
-3-

State V. McCardellr 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citations
omitted).

As noted in State v. Booker. 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 26

(Oct. 25, 1985):
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." jLtaJtfi
v- LammP Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);

fl£££iLd State v. Linden, Utah, 657 p.2d 1364,
1366 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.
Id. at 28 (citation omitted).

And, even if the Court views the

evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be
upheld.

State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

In short,

"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the
version of the facts which supports the verdict."

State v.

Isaacson, 704 p.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (ciiing State v. Howell,
649 P.2d at 93).
In this case defendant himself acknowledged that he was
in possession of the compressor on or about May 23, 1984.
(R. 190-91)

Defendant gave his testimony generally, and supplied

demeanor evidence in the course of giving it.

(R. 190-203)

Mr.

Adams gave full testimony, (R. 115-136) and clearly and
definitely testified that he told defendant the compressor was
stolen, including some detail regarding circumstances of the
theft.

(R. 118-19)

The value and contraband nature of the

marijuana also were evidence in support of the charge, as
discussed in POINT III below.

Other witnesses provided testimony

-4-

that added t o the f u l l p i c t u r e of the t r a n s a c t i o n involved.

See

the testimony, for example, of Mr. Ward (R. 158-168 and e s p . 16768) and of Mr. Church (R. 1 6 8 - 1 7 2 ) .
The jury members were instructed that they were "to
determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each
witness."

(R. 56, Instruction No. 13)

This accords with "the

fundamental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury."
JQaJZiSr Utah, 689 P.2d 5, 11 (1984).

State v.

Simply because some of the

evidence was contradicted, does not mean there must have been a
reasonable doubt.

The jury received competent testimony and

evidence on each contested issue, which, if believed and
accepted, would support the verdict.

The jury was entitled to

believe which witnesses it determined to believe, and to evaluate
the evidence.
POINT II
THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE
ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION

Defendant contends that

one of the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s ,

Mr. Adams, was an accomplice t o the crime with which defendant
was charged, that defendant's c o n v i c t i o n was had upon Mr. Adam's
uncorroborated testimony, that that testimony was s e l f
c o n t r a d i c t o r y , uncertain or improbable, and that t h e r e f o r e the
t r i a l judge was required t o g i v e a cautionary

accomplice

instruction.
F i r s t of a l l , i t i s submitted t h a t Mr. Adams was not an
accomplice s i n c e defendant's a c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d a separate crime
from that committed by Mr. Adams.
-5-

In S t a t e v. Berg. Utah, 613

P.2d 1125 (1980) the Court affirmed a conviction challenged on
the ground that the witness was an accomplice whose testimony had
to be corroborated.

Defendant in that case had been convicted of

unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.

The witness1

activities had consisted of receiving marijuana from defendant
under an agreement of sale (though defendant in fact never
received payment) and subsequently selling it to a third party.
"The subsequent sale made by [the witness] was not at issue,n
said the Court; rather, the witness' "participation amounted to
the crime of possession" and "thus she was not an accomplice to
one charged with unlawful distribution."

Xd. at 1126.

Similarly, in this case the prior theft by Mr. Adams is
not at issue, and Mr. Adams' participation amounted to the crime
of theft under a code section other than U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-408
(Supp. 1985) for violation of which defendant here was charged.
Thus, Mr. Adams was not an accomplice to one charged with
receiving, retaining or disposing of stolen property under § 766-408.
Second, Mr. Adam's testimony was not uncorroborated.
The testimony of other witnesses, including defendant himself
regarding possession of the compressor and the value of the
commodity given in exchange for it, (R. 190-91, 121) was
consistent with and supportive of the testimony of Mr. Adams.
Third, even if Mr. Adams were an accomplice and his
testimony were uncorroborated, the instruction in this case would
be "liln the discretion of the court."
7(2) (1982).

-6-

U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-

Finally, the testimony of Mr. Adams was not "self
contradictory, uncertain or improbable."
definite and consistent.

Id.

(ii££, e.g. R. 118-19)

It was clear,
Indeed,

defendant argues that it was defendant who offered evidence that
was contrary to that of the witness.

The existence of

defendant's competing testimony in no way renders Adams1 own
testimony "self contradictory, uncertain or improbable."
In sum, none of the multiple and demanding
circumstances that must be shown before a cautionary accomplice
instruction becomes necessary, was present in this case.
POINT III
SINCE THE STATE'S ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS
ATTENDANT TO THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMPETENT
AND RELEVANT TO PROVE MATERIAL FACTS
REGARDING THE CHARGE, THAT ACCOUNT WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED.
This Court established, in construing former Utah Rule
of Evidence 55 (1977) (which is the same for relevant purposes as
Rule 404(b)) that "evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs that
is competent and relevant to prove some material fact, other than

to show merely the general disposition of the defendantr is
admissible."

State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983)

(emphasis in original).

£&& alss

United States v. BradshaWr 690

F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1982), si&lX. jfellifcd, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983).

Further, even if the evidence implicates defendant in

the commission of other crimes for which he has not been charged,
that evidence is nevertheless admissible.
581 P.2d 856, 858 (1978).

-7-

Dutton v. State. Utah,

The information charged that defendant retained,
received or disposed of property of another worth more than $250,
knowing the property had been stolen or believing it probably had
been stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner.

The evidence

that the defendant paid to Michael Adams $100.00 worth of
marijuana was competent and significantly relevant in proof of
that issue.

It goes for example, to the question of the

defendants "knowledge" and "intent," both of which elements are
expressly stated in Rule 404(b) as acceptable bases for
admissibility.

Moreover, the knowledge and intent of defendant

it goes to show in this instance are the very criminal knowledge
and intent that are intrinsic to the crime.

And it goes to the

similar question of "belief" that is an alternative basis for
conviction under U.C.A., § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1985).
Following is one demonstration of the link.

If

defendant received the air compressor in return for something of
disproportionately small value, the jury reasonably could infer
knowledge or belief of defendant that the item was, or probably
was, stolen, and intent to commit the crime.

Here, in fact,

though the discounted purchase price of the air compressor was
$307, and the insurance reimbursement, after subtracting $100 for
the deductible, was in the amount of $275 (R. 108), the value of
the marijuana given in exchange was only $100.

(R. 121)

Also, the trade of something contraband, such as
marijuana, for the compressor is probative of the compressor's
being stolen because contraband is more typically and readily

-8-

exchanged for stolen property than for legitimate goods.

And

:here are other inferences the jury might draw from the relative
falue of the exchanged items,

• rom the manner of theii

exchange, that would bear on the existence or non-existence of
the crime charged.
Evidence of the exchange of the compressor for the
marijuana was, at the least, "inextricably intertwined" with
evidence essential to prove commission of the crime charged, and
was therefore clearly admissible under general

United

States v. McCrMy, 699 f.2d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983) (in
prosecution for aiding and abet tiny introduction of drugs in
federal prison, evidence of other acts of dealing in drugs in
prison held "inextricably intertwined" with evidence used to
prove crime charged).

JS&& generally 2

, Weinstein h M. Berger,

K.ein stein's Evidence S 404110] at 77 9 (1985). £1. United States
v. Blanton, 730 F. 2d 1425, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984) (evidence of
other wrongdoing at time of arrest of defendant not inadmissible
under Pule 404(b) because that evidence was "part of the X£S
gestae of the offense*I.
The District Court correctly ruled thai "the State is
entitled to present a full and accurate account of the
circumstances of the commission o£ the crime with which the
defendant is charged."

(R. 65)

The probative value of the

account presented outweighs any possible prejudice.

The account

was essential to the jury'b under B» and) n<j of the case.
intrinsic to the crime.

It is admissible.

-9-

It is

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict.

The circumstances surrounding Mr.

Adam's testimony, and the testimony itself, foreclosed any need
for a cautionary accomplice instruction.

The evidence relating

to the consideration given in exchange for stolen property was
competent and relevant to prove material facts and was therefore
properly admitted.
The juryfs verdict should be upheld, and the District
Court's rulings should be affirmed.
DATED this

' s

day of May, 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

RALPH L. FINLAYSON *
Assistant Attorney General
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